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By RAOUL D. KENNEDY*
IN May of 1962, 15 year old Kevin McGinnis and another boy
purchased a can of gunpowder from Nelson Piper, a Sacramento gun
and ammunition dealer. A week later, while the boys were playing
with the powder, it exploded, injuring McGinnis. The boy's mother
brought an action on his behalf against Piper, who in turn notified his
insurance carrier of the suit, demanding that it defend him. The com-
pany refused, citing the so-called "products hazard exclusion"1 in the
* B.A., 1964, University of the Pacific; LL.B., 1967, University of California,
Berkeley; Member, California Bar.
1. The standard liability insurance policy obligates the insurer: "To pay on be-
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time re-
sulting therefrom, sustained by any person, [and] caused by accident . . . "'
This coverage is, however, not applicable to products hazards which are defined
by the policy as: "(1) goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed
by the named insured or by others trading under his name, if the accident occurs
after possession of such goods or products has been relinquished to others by the named
insured or by others trading under his name and if such accident occurs away from
the premises owned, rented or controlled by the named insured or on premises for
which the classification stated in the declarations excludes any part of the foregoing
provided, such goods or products shall be deemed to include any container thereof,
other than a vehicle, but shall not include any vending machine or any property,
other than such container, rented to or located for use of others but not sold; (2) op-
erations, including any act or omission in connection with operations performed by or
on behalf of the named insured on the premises or elsewhere and whether or not
goods or products are involved in such operations, if the accident occurs after such
operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away from premises owned,
rented or controlled by the named insured; provided, operations shall not be deemed
incomplete because improperly or defectively performed or because further operations
may be required pursuant to an agreement; provided, further, the following shall not
be deemed to be 'operations' within the meaning of this paragraph: (a) pick-up or
delivery, except from or onto a railroad car, (b) the maintenance of vehicles owned or
used by or in behalf of the insured, (c) the existence of tools, uninstalled equipment
and abandoned or unused materials and (d) operations for which the classification
stated in the declarations specifically included completed operations." See generally
7A 3. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4508 (1958); 2 R. HuRSH, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PRODUCTs Lanmrry §§ 11.1-.12 (1961).
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liability insurance policy. At trial, Piper was found to have been negli-
gent in selling the powder to the boys in violation of provisions of the
Health and Safety Code forbidding such sales to minors. After a judg-
ment was entered against Piper, he assigned his claim of coverage to
the McGinnises, who filed suit against Piper's carrier.
The trial court found that the exclusion did not preclude cover-
age. This decision was affirmed on appeal,2 where it was con-
cluded that the injury was caused not by a product defect but by
Piper's negligence.3
While the products hazard exclusion has long been a part of the
standard form liability insurance policy, McGinnis v. Fidelity & Casu-
alty Co. is the first reported California decision which has attempted
to determine under what circumstances a case involving a product falls
within or without the ambit of the products hazard exclusion. In recent
years, since Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,4 California has
consistently been a leader in the development of products liability law, 5
particularly through the extension of the doctrine of strict liability in
tort.6 Not surprisingly, liability insurance carriers have taken note of
this expansion and have excluded products liability coverage in the
absence of an additional premium.7
Most of the earlier strict liability decisions in California involved
major corporate defendants who were presumably either self-insured or
well able to bear the cost of an added premium for products coverage. 8
2. McGinnis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 276 A.C.A. 34, 80 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1969).
3. Id. at 36, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
4. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
5. See generally Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1681 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (strict liability applied for an injury to a bystander); Seeley v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (strict liability
applied to property damage); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391
P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (strict liability applied even though some of the
product's integral components were produced by others, and a portion of its assembly
was delegated to others); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1969) (strict liability applied to cutting, grading and filling of land); Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (strict liability
applied to builder of tract homes). See generally Prosser, Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966).
7. The products liability insurance rates vary widely and are dependent upon
the nature of the product as well as the number of units manufactured, sold, handled
or distributed by the named insured. See generally NATIONAL UNDERWRITERS Co., FIRE,
CASUALTY AND SURETY BULLETINS (published irregularly).
8. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
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But the extension of strict liability beyond the traditional manufac-
turer9 has created countless new defendants who may simply be unable
to purchase special products coverage. Even in those cases where there
is a major manufacturer defendant, the far less solvent wholesaler, re-
tailer and other intermediaries are also necessary defendants in a suit
predicated upon strict liability."0 While these defendants may recover
indemnity from the manufacturer" and hence have less need for insur-
ance to satisfy a judgment against them, they may still be unable to bear
the initial expense of successfully defending such a suit and may need
liability insurance to meet this cost."
The interpretation and application of the products hazard exclu-
sion and, more precisely, the determination of exactly what coverage
is excluded by the products hazard exclusion, are matters of immediate
concern and promise to grow in importance as strict liability concepts
continue to be extended. The scope of the exclusion is important, not
only to insurers and insureds, but also to plaintiffs and potential plain-
tiffs, who will not be impressed by the logic and expedience of strict
liability if they are unable to satisfy the judgments they obtain.
It is the purpose of this article to review the development of the
products hazard exclusion and, more important, to attempt to predict
its future interpretation and application in light of McGinnis.
Past Development of the Products Hazard Exclusion
Ninth Circuit Decisions
Prior to 1967, the products hazard exclusion had not been touched
upon in a reported California decision,' 3 although the clause had been
17 (1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
9. See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749 (1969); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
10. E.g., Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 A.C.A. 369, 375, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 197 (1969) (cases cited therein).
11. RESTATEMENT OF REST ON § 93(1) (1937). See also Comment, Con-
tribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 490 (1969).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. Several California cases involving construction contracts considered provi-
sions which excluded the insurer from liability for damage sustained by goods,
products, or premises which are alienated, or for damage done by work which has
been completed. E.g., Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 583,
587-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 329, 331-32 (1960): "This Exclusion means that if the insured
becomes liable to replace or repair any 'goods or products' or 'premises alienated' or
'work completed' after the same has caused an accident because of a defective condi-
tion, the cost of such replacement or repair is not recoverable under the policy. How-
ever, if the accident also caused damage to some other property or caused personal
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dealt with in some federal court opinions.14  In Bitts v. General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,'5 the assured, Bonell, sold com-
ponent refrigerator parts to one Bitts with knowledge that Bitts would
attempt to assemble them as a refrigerator. While attempting to do so,
Bitts opened the end of a refrigeration coil and was injured when high
pressure gas escaped with explosive force.
The insurer, General Accident, refused to defend Bonell against
the resultant suit by Bitts, citing the products hazard exclusion in its
policy. Bonell brought an action for declaratory relief against the in-
surer and Bitts to determine his rights under the insurance policy. Af-
ter removal to federal court, the district judge, relying entirely on out-
of-state authority (much of which spoke in terms of a products "de-
fect") ,16 concluded that the exclusion was applicable and denied cover-
age. 7 Significantly, the court failed to explain whether its decision
was based simply on a finding that the refrigeration coil was defective
or on a finding that Bonell's failure to warn Bitts of its dangerous
propensities was within the ambit of the exclusion.
On appeal, Bitts and Bonell contended, not that the coil was de-
fective, but that Bonell had negligently failed to worn of the coil's
dangerous characteristics and of the consequences that would flow from
opening the coil.'8 The Ninth Circuit accepted their theory, but re-
injury, the insured's liability for such damage or injury becomes a liability of the insurer
under the policy, and is not excluded. For example, if a contractor builds a house and
as a result of an improper mixture of the stucco, water is absorbed into the walls and
the stucco cracks and falls off and a child is injured by the falling stucco, the injury
to the child would not be excluded under Exclusion (f) but the replacement cost of
the stucco would be excluded. Also, if the water absorbed into the walls should
reach the interior walls and injure a valuable painting hanging there, the damage to
the painting would be recoverable under the policy while the damage to the walls
would not. The principle here applicable is well stated in [Heyward v. American Cas.
Co., 129 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D.S.C. 1955)]: 'This Exclusion means that the policy will
not protect the insured if he has to repair or replace some product or work which
proved defective and caused an accident. The Exclusion has no reference to liability
for damage to other property or personal injury arising out of such accident."' Ac-
cord, Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d
881 (1959); Volf v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 373, 325 P.2d 987 (1958).
14. Bitts v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.
1960), aff'g sub nom. Bonell v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 167 F. Supp.
384 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 264 F.2d
879 (9th Cir. 1959).
15. 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1960), a!f'g sub nom. Bonell v. General Acc. Fire &
Life Assurance Corp., 167 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
16. 167 F. Supp. at 388.
17. Id. at 389.
18. Bitts v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.
1960).
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jected the notion that the products exclusion was restricted to defects.
The court relied on Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Northwest Casu-
alty Co.9 as authority for the proposition that the products exclusion
is equally applicable to negligence.20
In Tidewater, an appeal from the Oregon federal district court,
one of the plaintiff's employees had sold to a Mrs. Buffington a can of
stove oil that was apparently contaminated with gasoline. The mix-
ture subsequently exploded, injuring Mrs. Buffington. Apparently, the
same hose had been used to deliver both gasoline and stove oil and a
gasoline delivery had been made immediately before the sale of the
stove oil to Mrs. Buffington. She brought suit against Tidewater on
alternative theories of negligence and breach of warranty.
The insurer, Northwest Casualty, denied coverage on the basis of
a products hazard exclusion contained in the policy issued to Tide-
water. The latter filed suit against the insurer, contending that its em-
ployee's negligence, or use of faulty equipment to deliver the stove oil,
did not constitute a defective product or even pertain to a product.
The court rejected this theory, finding that the stove oil was clearly a
"'product' as that term [was] used in the endorsement."' It fur-
ther found that the employee's negligence did not remove the incident
from the aegis of the exclusion:
In practically every case in which injury or damage is caused by
the handling or use of a product, or by a defective condition in such
product, the occurrence causing the injury or damage can be traced
to some pre-existing negligence. Indeed, were this not so the in-jured person would have no basis for a tort claim against the in-
sured -.2 2
The court concluded that the case before it fell within the first
subdivision of the exclusion (products) and, consequently, that no
coverage was provided. It added that even if the facts of the case were
conceptualized as being encompassed by the second subdivision of the
exclusion (operations), the stove oil incident had occurred after the
operation (delivery) was completed, thus bringing the case squarely
within the operations section of the exclusion.23
The Ninth Circuit, in relying on Tidewater in Bitts, conceded that
the case involved an Oregon accident and, therefore, had no application
to the present case if California state law was to the contrary. Bonell
19. 264 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1959).
20. 282 F.2d at 543.
21. 264 F.2d at 882.
22. Id.
23. Id. For the language of a products hazard exclusion see note 1 supra.
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offered two clearly distinguishable California cases,2 4 neither of which
involved the products hazard exclusion in issue. Not surprisingly, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that "[t]hese cases cannot apply, as authority, to
the cause with which we are concerned,"2 5 and upheld the finding of no
coverage.
California Decisions
As previously noted, the scope of the products hazard exclusion
was not considered in a reported California state court opinion until
1967. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification
Co.,2 6 the insured, a dealer in swimming pool water purification ma-
chines, was seeking to establish coverage for a suit involving the elec-
trocution of a swimmer. In the course of installing the water purifier,
the insured had cleaned the pool and, in so doing, had accidentally
broken an underwater light. The swimmer was electrocuted because
of this act of negligence. The insurer brought an action for declaratory
relief, contending that it was relieved of liability because of a products
hazard exclusion contained in the policy.
Before addressing itself to the case in issue, the supreme court, in
an unanimous opinion by Justice Tobriner, reviewed, with obvious rel-
ish, the treatment that had been accorded the exclusion by other juris-
dictions:
When confronted with products hazard clauses, many courts,
troubled by the difficulty of ascertaining their meaning, have
warned against interpreting them to deny the basic insurance con-
templated by the insured. "In summary, the plaintiff gave the
defendant coverage in a single, simple sentence easily understood
by the common man in the market place. It attempted to take
away a portion of this same coverage in paragraphs and language
which even a lawyer, be he from Philadelphia or Bungy, would
find it difficult to comprehend." "The true meaning of the policy
is difficult to determine. An examination of it involves a physical
effort of no mean proportions . . . . If [the reader] is possessed
of reasonable physical dexterity, coupled with average mental ca-
pacity, he may then attempt to integrate and harmonize the dubi-
ous meanings to be found in this not inconsiderable package. A
confused attempt to set forth an insuring agreement is later assailed
by such a bewildering array of exclusions, definitions and condi-
tions, that the result is confounding .... ,,27
Turning to the case at hand, the court dismissed the insurer's
24. Miesen v. Bolich, 177 Cal. App. 2d 145, 1 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1960); Chrysler
Motors v. Royal Indem. Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 785, 174 P.2d 318 (1946).
25. 282 F.2d at 543.
26. 67 Cal. 2d 679, 433 P.2d 174, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1967).
27. Id. at 689-90, 433 P.2d at 181, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (citations omitted).
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theory of noncoverage on the grounds that such "[a] wide and sweeping
interpretation of the products clause would eliminate practically all
meaningful insurance for [the insured]. Since all of its business is
connected in a broad sense with [a single product], the insured would
then be protected from losses only if they occur before [it] has completed
its operations. '28
The court attempted to evolve a more realistic standard for apply-
ing the products hazard exclusion and looked first to the rationale be-
hind the provision in question:
The genesis of the products hazard exclusion apparently lies in the
broad potentiality for injury from products possessing inherent
hazards and in the doctrine of strict liability for defective products,
against which insurers sought to protect themselves. 9
With this rationale in mind, it was found that the cleaning of the pool
was a sufficiently distinct operation from the sale or installation of the
water purification device to remove the insured's negligence from the
ambit of the products hazard exclusion. Coverage was found to be
present.
While Electronic Purification brought the products hazard exclu-
sion to the attention of a California court, the facts of the case clearly
involved an "operation" within the meaning of subdivision "2' of the
exclusion. Thus, it was not until McGinnis v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. 0 that the court was called upon to construe subdivision "1," the
products portion of the exclusion.',
As previously mentioned, McGinnis involved an injury to a minor
caused by the explosion of a quantity of gunpowder which had been
sold to him in violation of the California Health and Safety Code.3 2
The seller's insurer refused to defend because the seller's policy con-
tained a products hazard exclusion which denied coverage for injuries
caused by "goods or products . . . manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed by the named insured or by others trading under his
name."
33
The appellate court, apparently composed of lawyers from neither
Philadelphia nor Bungy, experienced no difficulty in comprehending
the exclusion: "One would be hard put to express a 'products liability'
exclusion more clearly than does the foregoing clause upon which [the
28. Id. at 690, 433 P.2d at 181, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
29. Id. at 688, 433 P.2d at 180, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
30. 276 A.C.A. 34, 80 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1969).
31. See note 1 supra.
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 12000, 12101.5.
33. 276 A.C.A. at 36, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
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insurer] relies."34  Since it was undisputed that Piper had not paid
the additional premium necessary to obtain products coverage, the only
question before the court was whether the particular conduct com-
plained of fell within the ambit of the exclusion. The court found that
it did not:
The storekeeper in a products liability case is usually an inno-
cent link in the chain of distribution who unknowingly sells a de-
fective product. His liability does not stem from culpability; it is
imposed by law as a matter of expedience. The injury, here, was
not caused by a defective product. The powder did exactly what
it was designed to do and what everyone expected it to do; it ex-
ploded when detonated. Consequently, this is not a products lia-
bility case because no negligence can be attributed to the manu-
facturer. Stated another way, Piper was not an innocent link in
the chain of distribution; he was negligent in selling to the minor,
and his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. 35
The court next addressed itself to whether coverage could be de-
nied on the ground that the accident occurred away from the premises.
It found that Piper's decision not to buy products coverage had been
prompted by his belief that he could obtain indemnification from the
manufacturer for a defective product on the basis of warranty or strict
liability. 36 He had evidently never expected the products exclusion to
apply to accidents caused by something other than a defective product.
The court, relying heavily on a discussion in Electronic Purification37
of the importance of the insured's expectations as to the quantum of
coverage, held that Piper could not be bound by the operation of the
exclusion where his own negligence was involved.38
It is apparent from the McGinnis decision that the California court
refused to subscribe to the sweeping interpretation of the products haz-
ard exclusion in Tidewater39 and Bitts. ° The blithe assumption that
any accident bearing any relationship to a product is within the purview
of the exclusion-"practically every . . .defective condition . . . can
34. Id.
35. Id., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 37, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Consideration of this contention appears to
have been totally supererogatory: If the products exclusion is not applicable to inde-
pendent negligence by the insured, it can make no difference where that negligence
or the resultant accident occurs.
37. 67 Cal. 2d 679, 688, 433 P.2d 174, 180, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1967).
38. 276 A.C.A. at 37, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
39. Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.
1959).
40. Bitts v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.
1960).
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be traced to some pre-existing negligence"41 -is clearly undermined by
the McGinnis holding. It is no longer sufficient for the insurer to show
merely that an accident bore some tangential relation to the insured's
product to avoid the duty to defend and indemnify; henceforth, the
insurer will have to demonstrate a nexus between the accident and a
defect or deficiency in the insured's product. Nevertheless, the real
importance of McGinnis is not what it held but what it portends, espe-
cially when it is considered in conjunction with decisions from other
jurisdictions which have had occasion to interpret the products exclu-
sion in the context of somewhat more advanced and considerably more
sophisticated theories and fact situations.
Future Developments
Nondefective Products
Of necessity, any attempt to predict the future treatment of the
products hazard exclusion by the courts of California involves some
speculation. It is relatively certain, however, that cases before the Cali-
fornia courts involving negligently or improperly handled-as opposed
to inherently defective-products will extend and confirm the princi-
ples enunciated in McGinnis and follow the lead of other states that
have already made such a distinction.
For example, in Gehrlein Tire Co. v. American Employers Insur-
ance Co.,42 a customer brought a tire and a rim, purchased elsewhere,
to Gehrlein for assembly. Shortly thereafter, the assembled wheel and
rim exploded as a result of a latent defect, injuring the customer. Since
Gehrlein had manufactured neither the tire nor the rim, it was not liable
for the defect but was held responsible for having failed to discover
and warn the customer of the defect.
Gehrlein's insurer denied all coverage, claiming that the case in-
volved a product which had been handled by the insured. The court
rejected this argument and ruled that the products hazard exclusion was
inapplicable because liability had resulted not from the defect, but from
the insured's negligent failure to warn of the defect.
Similarly, in Thibodeaux v. Parks Equipment Co.,43 a valve manu-
factured by the insured failed, injuring a customer's employee. The
Louisiana Court of Appeals found that the manufacturer's insurer had
41. Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 879, 882 (9th
Cir. 1959).
42. 243 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1964), affd mem., 348 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.
1965).
43. 140 So. 2d 215 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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no duty to defend insofar as the underlying personal injury complaint
sought damages as a consequence of the "manufacture of the valve.144
The court, however, went on to find that the products hazard exclusion
did not relieve the insurer of the duty to defend and indemnify with
regard to allegations in the personal injury complaint that the manu-
facturer had been negligent "in representing to Delta Tank Manufac-
turing Company [the injured party's employer] that the valve could be
used as a component part of the Dryex unit . . . in failing to warn
Delta that the valve could not safely be used in the Dryex unit. . . in
failing to give proper instructions for its use. . and in failing to give
proper instructions for the installation in the unit. .. 2 5
In Atkins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,48 Atkins, a phar-
macist, was sued for having negligently sold a narcotic drug with re-
sultant mental and physical detriment to the user. Atkins' insurer,
Hartford, denied coverage, citing the products hazard exclusion. The
trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Atkins and was up-
held by the Michigan Court of Appeals which noted that the Atkins
policy promised "[tlo pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom,
sustained by any person and caused by accident. 14 7 The court went on
to find that the "accident" was the negligent sale of the pills. There
was nothing inherently dangerous about the pills if used with the proper
instructions. Therefore, but for the negligent sale of the pills, the in-
jury would not have occurred.48  When "gunpowder" is substituted for
"pills" in the foregoing passage, Atkins becomes virtually indistinguish-
able from McGinnis."
44. Id. at 220.
45. Id.
46. 7 Mich. App. 414, 151 N.W.2d 846 (1967).
47. Id. at 417, 151 N.W.2d at 847.
48. Id. at 418, 151 N.W.2d at 848.
49. Not all courts that have passed on this question have held that negligence
is outside the ambit of the products hazard exclusion. E.g., Orchard v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ore. 1964), afj'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 948 (9th Cir.
1965). In that case the court stated: "Orchard contends . . . that the accident in
question was not the result of a defective product but of the act of supplying a good
but wrong part, which was done as an operation of the business.
"This theory rests on the unwarranted assumption that the term 'Products Lia-
bility' is a restricted one. Specifically, that it is restricted to types of liability arising
solely out of defects in goods or products, and does not apply to business operations
relative to the distribution, installation, or servicing of these goods." Id. at 566; see
2 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.3 (1961).
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Uncompleted Operations
It is less certain, but still entirely possible, that California will
also follow a line of decisions holding that a negligent misrepresentation
or negligent failure to warn made in connection with the sale or distri-
bution of a product, as opposed to a defect in the product, should be
conceptualized as an "operation" within the meaning of subdivision
"2' of the exclusion. These decisions further hold that such an oper-
ation does not become completed (and within the purview of the prod-
ucts exclusion) until someone relies on the negligent representation or
lack thereof.
In Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co.,5"
the insured's agent had allegedly represented to the plaintiff in the
underlying personal injury action that a grinding wheel, not manu-
factured by the insured, was suitable for use on a grinding machine
manufactured by the insured. The wheel disintegrated while being
used on the insured's machine with resultant personal injuries to the
user. The personal injury action was based on negligent misrepresenta-
tion.
Pacific Employers rejected the insured's request to defend and in-
demnify, claiming that the incident in question fell within the ambit
of the products hazard exclusion. The Fifth Circuit concluded that a
negligent representation falls within the "operations," rather than the
"products," portion of the exclusion.51 The court then held that "an
operation consisting of a negligent representation made for the purpose
of, or reasonably calculated to induce action is not completed until the
person to whom the representation is made acts in reliance upon that
representation."52 Since the operations portion of the exclusion applied
only to "completed operations," the accident in question was held to be
outside the purview of the exclusion and, therefore, entitled to coverage
under the policy.
In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Snow,53 the insured operated a
fumigating business and sprayed the hold of a Waterman vessel with a
toxic mixture. The insured subsequently advised longshoremen, pre-
paring to work in the hold, that the toxic spray would be sufficiently
dissipated to allow them to come aboard safely. Acting in reliance on
this representation, the longshoremen entered the hold. One of them
50. 198 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 920 (1953).
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id.
53. 222 F. Supp. 892 (D. Ore. 1963), affd mem. sub nom. General Acc. Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Snow, 331 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1964).
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thereafter became ill as a consequence of inhaling the noxious fumes,
which had not in fact sufficiently dissipated. The injured longshore-
man filed suit against the insured who referred the matter to his insurer.
Predictably, the latter refused to defend, citing the products hazard ex-
clusion in the policy. The district court, relying heavily upon Reed,
found that although the original spraying was a "completed operation"
within the meaning of the exclusion, the insured's representations as to
the safety of the hold constituted "a new operation, separate, complete
and distinct from the original operation." 54  This later operation did
not become "complete" within the meaning of the exclusion, until it
had been relied upon by the longshoremen. Thus the exclusion was
deemed inapplicable and coverage was upheld.
The Reed-Snow concept was further refined in Eastcoast Equip-
ment Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co." The insured, Eastcoast, was
named as a defendant in a personal injury action brought by two plain-
tiffs who had been injured when a crane cable broke causing the boom
of the crane to fall and strike them. Eastcoast had manufactured and
distributed the crane. The plaintiffs proceeded against Eastcoast on
alternative theories: breach of warranty and negligent misrepresen-
tation that the cable could properly be used with the crane. After suc-
cessfully defending the personal injury actions, Eastcoast brought suit
to recover counsel fees and costs incurred as a consequence of Mary-
land's refusal to defend on the basis of the products hazard exclusion.
The court found Reed and Snow to be particularly helpful because
they dealt with representations by the insured, rather than with physical
acts upon goods or products. Although usual connotations associated
with the word "operations" implies physical acts, the court found that
this implication did not preclude an act of representation from also
being an operation.56  Accordingly, the court addressed itself to
whether the operation had been completed prior to the accident:
The crane and boom Eastcoast distributed was a complicated
piece of machinery. The cable that Eastcoast recommended for
use with this crane was possibly of the same complicated nature.
Although the complaints against Eastcoast are not specific on this
point, the evidence could very possibly have been that the repre-
sentations of Eastcoast had, in fact, not been completed, but that
there would be further instructions and recommendations, in-
cluded in the broad term representations, on the use of the crane
and cable. If these facts were introduced as evidence of uncom-
54. 222 F. Supp. at 900.
55. 207 Pa. Super. 383, 218 A.2d 91 (1966), aff'g mem. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 499,
218 A.2d 91 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1965).
56. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 508, 218 A.2d at 96.
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pleted negligent representations of Eastcoast, then in no sense could
the operations of Eastcoast be said to have been completed.57
Because of these hypothetical exigencies, the court concluded that
Maryland Casualty had been obligated to provide Eastcoast with a de-
fense and was, therefore, liable for the costs and attorneys' fees incurred
by the insured.5
The McGinnis holding that negligence is outside the ambit of sub-
division "1," the products portion of the exclusion,59 suggests that Cali-
fornia may well characterize misrepresentations and failures to warn
as operations. There is, however, language in other California deci-
sions that suggests that inadequate warnings are "defects" and, there-
fore, arguably within subdivision "1."10 While these cases are con-
cerned with liability to third parties and are hence distinguishable, they
will undoubtedly have to be overcome by proponents of the rule ex-
pounded in the line of cases beginning with Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pa-
cific Employers Insurance Co.61
If California does decline to follow Reed and refuses to label mis-
representations as operations, coverage proponents will seemingly be
provided with an alternative line of argument. Subdivision "1" of the
exclusion applies only to "goods or products manufactured, sold, han-
dled or distributed by the named insured or by others trading under
his name. ... '1 Both Reed and Eastcoast involved products which
were recommended by the insured, but which do not appear to have
fallen within any of the four types of activity itemized in subdivi-
sion "1." Had the courts in those cases found the misrepresented
57. Id. at 513, 218 A.2d at 99.
58. Some cases have, however, found that failures to warn and misrepresenta-
tions do fall within the purview of the products hazard exclusion. See, e.g., Inducto-
therm Corp. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 83 NJ. Super. 464, 471-72, 200 A.2d
358, 363 (Law Div. 1964); see R. HunsH, AME=CAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiAsarry
§ 11.9 (1961).
59. McGinnis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 276 A.C.A. 34, 37, 80 Cal. Rptr. 482, 484
(1969).
60. See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 52-55, 46
Cal. Rptr. 552, 557-59 (1965); Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,
860, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963).
61. 198 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1952); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp.
892 (D. Ore. 1963); Eastcoast Equip. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 38 Pa. D. & C. 2d
499, 218 A.2d 91 (1966).
62. See note 1 supra.
63. In Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1952), a salesman for the insured represented that a grinding wheel manufactured
by another was suitable for use on a machine manufactured by Reed. There is no
suggestion in the decision that Reed had any official connection with the sale or dis-
tribution of the wheel. Similarly, in Eastcoast Equip. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 38
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products to have fallen within subdivision "1," it seems clear the
exclusion would have been found inapplicable. Thus, should the Cali-
fornia courts find misrepresentations to be within the aegis of subdi-
vision "1," a finding of coverage will, nevertheless, seem to be a neces-
sary result.
The pertinent dictum in Electronic Purification4 and the actual
holding in McGinnis65 suggest rather strongly that California will limit
application of the products portion of the exclusion (subdivision "1")
to the purpose for which it was originally designed: to exclude acci-
dents resulting from products possessing inherent defects. Accidents
connected with products, but which are not shown to have resulted
from a defect in the product, will in all probability be entitled to cov-
erage. It appears equally likely that the operations section of the exclu-
sion (subdivision "2") will be subject to a similar limitation. The
Electronic Purification decision cited with approval the holding in Gehr-
lein Tire Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co.,66 that "'operations'
refers to workmanship on products. Any hazard with relation to
products is excluded because it is the manufacturer's responsibility."6 7
When this rationale is considered with the "original purpose" approach
endorsed by both Electronic Purification and McGinnis, the most prob-
able result will be the restriction of subdivision "2" to those operations
which create, or contribute to the creation, of an inherently defective
product.
The Role of the Practitioner
If there is any lesson to be learned from other jurisdictions that
have attempted to limit the sweep of the products hazard exclusion it is
that the coverage decisions are influenced to a surprising degree by (1)
the inventiveness and resourcefulness of counsel, and (2) by the manner
in which the complaint in the underlying personal injury action is
drafted.
The interrelationship of these two factors has already been amply
demonstrated in the completed-operations cases. In each of those deci-
Pa. D. & C.2d 499, 218 A.2d 91 (1966), the insured recommended that a cable, manu-
factured by another, be used on a crane produced by the insured. Again, there is no
indication that the insured had any other involvement with the cable.
64. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
688, 433 P.2d 174, 180, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1967).
65. McGinnis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 276 A.C.A. 34, 80 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1969).
66. 243 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
67. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
686, 433 P.2d 174, 179, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1967), quoting Gehrlein Tire Co. v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 577, 581 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
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sions, the court seized upon the fact that the plaintiff in the underlying
personal injury action had alleged that the insured had misrepresented
the safety or failed to warn of the danger of the injury-producing prod-
uct.68 One wonders if the outcome of these cases would not have been
entirely different had either the insured's counsel in the coverage action
failed to call to the court's attention the exact wording and the nuances
of meaning of the personal injury complaint, or had the plaintiff in
the underlying action, wishing to avoid the problems of proof inherent
in an allegation of negligence, chosen to employ only the doctrine of
strict liability and contended that the product itself was defective.
This combination of blind chance and applied ingenuity is prob-
ably nowhere better exemplified than in the relatively ancient case of
Protane Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,69 wherein the insured sold
and serviced gas heaters through a system of independent contractors.
A heater in a home some distance from the insured's premises exploded
soon after being serviced by one of the insured's representatives. Pro-
tane's insurer refused to defend, citing the clause in the products hazard
exclusion which denied coverage where the "accident occur[ed] away
from the premises owned, rented or controlled by the named insured
.*. .."70 The home's occupants brought suit against the insured for
their personal injuries. At the trial of the action it was found that the
explosion had resulted from the negligent manner in which the insured
had trained the representative in the business of servicing gas heaters.
This instruction had taken place at the insured's premises. The court
found that while the accident may have occurred away from the in-
sured's premises in a physical sense, "[t]he casualty was caused in a
legal sense by [the insured's] negligence on its own premises" and con-
cluded that the exclusion in question was therefore inapplicable. 71
While the result in Protane is strained at best, the case does demon-
strate what an insured with a resourceful attorney can accomplish.
Even if the proffered coverage argument is not ultimately found
to entitle the insured to indemnity under his liability policy, it may at
least give rise to a duty to defend by the insurer.7 2  Indemnity is, of
68. Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir.
1952); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892, 900 (D. Ore. 1963); East-
coast Equip. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 38 Pa. D. & C. 2d 499, 506-08, 218 A.2d 91,
96 (1966).
69. 343 Pa. 189, 22 A.2d 674 (1941).
70. See note 1 supra.
71. 343 Pa. at 192, 22 A.2d at 675-76.
72. The leading case of Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), imposes on the insurer a duty to defend the insured whenever
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course, of no importance if the insured obtains a favorable verdict in
the underlying personal injury action. In fact, even if a verdict is re-
turned against them, 73 most retailer and distributor defendants can ob-
tain indemnity from the manufacturer. However, counsel fees are not
recoverable from a personal injury plaintiff even by a successful de-
fendant. 74  The insured's attorney who obtains a paid defense for his
client has made a sizeable, and in the event of a successful defense, the
only needed contribution.
But even the most resourceful attorney will have difficulty in ob-
taining a defense, much less indemnity, for the insured if the under-
lying personal injury action is pleaded and litigated in terms of strict
liability. It is not the purpose of this article to suggest collusion be-
tween the insured's personal attorney and counsel for the injured plain-
tiff. However, it is suggested that when the attorney for a plaintiff in-
jured in some way by the use of a product encounters a defendant with
no appreciable assets independent of an insurance policy containing a
products exclusion, he might be well advised to abandon a strict-liabil-
ity-defective-product cause of action and proceed on a theory of negli-
gence or negligent representation. The advantages of strict liability to
it ascertains facts which give rise to a potential duty to indemnify under the policy.
In that case, the issue was whether Zurich was obligated to defend its insured in an
action where he was charged with intentional assault, and the policy excluded cover-
age for intentional acts. The court held that the insurer did have an obligation to
defend, reasoning that the facts alleged might have supported, or by amendment could
have been made to support, a theory of negligent conduct of the insured, a theory
which would have been within the aegis of the policy. Id. at 277, 419 P.2d at 177,
54 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted: "The insured is unhappily sur-
rounded by concentric circles of uncertainty: the first, the unascertainable nature of
the insurer's duty to defend; the second, the unknown effect of the provision that the
insurer must defend even a groundless, false or fraudulent claim; the third, the uncer-
tain extent of the indemnification coverage. Since we must resolve uncertainties in
favor of the insured and interpret the policy provisions according to the layman's rea-
sonable expectations, and since the effect of the exclusionary clause is neither con-
spicuous, plain nor clear, we hold that in the present case the policy provides for an
obligation to defend and that such obligation is independent of the indemnification
coverage." Id. at 273-74, 419 P.2d at 174-75, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
Since "[n]o one can determine whether the third party suit does or does not fall
within the indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is resolved," Id. at
271, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109, the expectations of the parties can be
realized only if "the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within
the coverage of the policy ...... Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
73. See Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
490, 495 (1969).
74. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021. Attorney's fees may, however, be recoverable
from one codefendant in an indemnity action against another. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2778(3); Buchalter v. Levin, 252 Cal. App. 2d 367, 60 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1967).
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a plaintiff are of little consequence if the resulting judgment cannot be
satisfied.
Conclusion
There have as yet been only two reported California decisions that
have considered the products hazard exclusion, and only a single case,
McGinnis, that has considered a product, as opposed to an operation.
Nevertheless, given the prodigious and ever increasing amount of prod-
ucts liability litigation in this state, it is certain that the products hazard
exclusion will become a subject of growing judicial concern. For the
present it appears probable, but by no means certain, that the exclusion
will be restricted to cases involving an actually defective product.
While the California courts are evolving a comprehensive inter-
pretation of the exclusion, originality and imaginativeness will be of
premium importance to attorneys for insureds seeking to establish cov-
erage. Cases from other jurisdictions amply demonstrate the value of
such resourcefulness, both for the establishment of an immediate duty
to defend on the part of the insurer, and for the creation of an ultimate
duty to defend.
Pending the eventual determination by the California courts of
what is and is not within the purview of the exclusion, counsel for
plaintiffs in personal injury suits relating to products should give careful
thought to whether the insured's coverage will be needed to satisfy the
potential judgment and, if so, how the complaint should be drafted so
as to avoid the operation of the products hazard exclusion.
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